The U.S. military for years has debated the utility of counterinsurgency operations. Drawing from a sentiment that harkens back to the Vietnam War, many within the military have long opposed counterinsurgency operations. Others see counterinsurgency as the unavoidable future of U.S. warfare. The debate is between those who believe the purpose of a conventional military force is to defeat another conventional military force and those who believe conventional military conflicts increasingly will be replaced by conflicts more akin to recent counterinsurgency operations. In such conflicts, the purpose of a counterinsurgency is to transform an occupied society in order to undermine the insurgents.

Understanding this debate requires the understanding that counterinsurgency is not a type of warfare; it is one strategy by which a disproportionately powerful conventional force approaches asymmetric warfare. As its name implies, it is a response to an insurgency, a type of asymmetric conflict undertaken by small units with close links to the occupied population to defeat a larger conventional force. Insurgents typically are highly motivated -- otherwise they collapse easily -- and usually possess superior intelligence to a foreign occupational force. Small units operating with superior intelligence are able to evade more powerful conventional forces and can strike such forces at their own discretion. Insurgents are not expected to defeat the occupying force through direct military force. Rather, the assumption is that the occupying force has less interest in the outcome of the war than the insurgents and that over time, the inability to defeat the insurgency will compel the occupying force to withdraw.

According to counterinsurgency theory, the strength of an insurgency lies in the relationship between insurgents and the general population. The relationship provides a logistical base and an intelligence apparatus. It also provides sanctuary by allowing the insurgents to blend into the population and disappear under pressure. Counterinsurgency argues that severing this relationship is essential. The means for this consist of offering the population economic incentives, making deals with the traditional leadership and protecting the population from the insurgents, who might conduct retributive attacks for collaborating with the occupying force.

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George Friedman

George Friedman

George Friedman is the CEO and chief intelligence officer of Stratfor, a private intelligence company located in Austin, TX.

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6 Comments So Far
BRL... Wrote: Jun 07, 2012 12:45 AM
Mr Friedman: It took you a while to get around to your actual point, but when you finally did (middle of page 2) it was spot on.

Counterinsurgency assumes an existing friendly AND viable government in a country for us to support. Looking around the world, I see a handful of viable governments, half a handful of friendly governments, and not a lot of overlap in the two groups.

But counterterrorism, that's a whole other matter. The most it needs from other countries is overflight and basing rights, to save us money, although as long as we have a carrier force, they are optional. Counterterrorism means hammering an enemy wherever he is, and throwing in a little collateral damage to punish his enablers, such as Pakistan.
None1257 Wrote: Jun 06, 2012 12:20 PM
If the purpose of the military is to defend this country, do we even think about the need for a counter insurgency strategy?
king10 - formerly king Wrote: Jun 06, 2012 9:35 PM
You need to think about EVERY possibility militarily.
Larry1764 Wrote: Jun 06, 2012 11:33 AM
But it seems to me that the most important result of such a policy would be to make ANY operation a less-often chosen one. You need to know who and where the enemy is (and/or their ammunition is stored, e.g.) before you can arm an operation to strike. How do you find these things out without cooperation from the local populations? Without adequate knowledge you would simply not call for the strike. So, you get nothing done.
If you have enough intelligence, you also face the fact that even when you have successfully completed the operation, the hostile population and government (say, if it's in Pakistan, or any of the -istans) will condemn America anyway.
And if you automatically leave off the table invasion, occupation, trans
Larry1764 Wrote: Jun 06, 2012 11:35 AM
formation of the country, you are essentially conceding victory. And, in most cases (like Iran) that simply means you allow them to get stronger and farther along in their development of superiority for when you will be again be faced with the necessity to do what you should have done in the first place, but you then had been stronger to do. Smart?
David301 Wrote: Jun 06, 2012 10:10 AM
This is exactly how the Small Wars Manual (c.1935 from lessons learned in the 20's & 30's) describes to address counter-insurgency. And is ideally suited to the US Marine Corps IF the USMC goes back to it's light infantry/naval infantry core competencies. Everything old is new again - as the saying goes.