Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS) is arguably more
visible today than it has ever been its history (or than it
has ever wanted to be; the firm has traditionally valued a
low public profile). Outstanding results this year highlight
a firm that has
pulled away from its closest competitorsin the credit
crisis (
Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS) is still
recovering, and Merrill Lynch has been absorbed by
Bank of America (NYSE: BAC)). Add to that the
prospect of the most significant regulatory reform to hit the
financial services industry since the Great Depression, and
many investors are surely now asking themselves: "Is Goldman
a buy?"
Long-term is name of the game
I'm tackling the topic from the perspective of a
long-term investor; if you want to know what the shares will
do next week, I can't help you. Before we look forward, let's
take a look back at what Goldman shares have done for
investors since they began trading:
Annualized Total Return Since GS IPO (May
4, 1999)
Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS)
10.2%
S&P 500 Total Return
(0.4%)
Source: Author's calculations,
based on data from Capital IQ, a division of Standard &
Poor's.
Surely, these are fantastic returns: Goldman has crushed
the S&P 500, with a margin of outperformance of nearly 11
percentage points on an annual basis. I beg to differ: Here's
another way to think about the firm's return: Of the 428
S&P 500 components for which one can calculate total
returns over the same period, 102 -- nearly a quarter! --
bested Goldman's return. The table below contains two of
these.
Industry
Annualized Total Return Since Goldman
IPO
Apple (NYSE: AAPL)
Technology
30.9%
UnitedHealth Group (NYSE: UNH)
Sector
12.9%
Source: Author's calculations,
based on data from Capital IQ, a division of Standard &
Poor's.
This comparison is far from perfect, because the companies
in the S&P 500 aren't all at the same stage in their life
cycle; Goldman Sachs had been in business for 130 years by
the time it went public and was already a very large, mature
company. Neither am I suggesting that it was easy to predict
which companies would produce superior returns to Goldman's.
Many of those that did were high-risk companies (Celgene
(annualized return: +40.6%), Biogen Idec (15.7%) and Gilead
Sciences (29.9%) come to mind) and there could be no
guarantee of earning these sorts of returns.
Risky business
On that topic, it's worth remembering that Goldman
common shares are a
veryhigh-risk proposition (much higher than the $5
billion in preferred shares that Warren Buffett purchased on
behalf of
Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK-A) (NYSE:
BRK-B)). A 10.2% annualized return is, to my mind, inadequate
to compensate the shareholders of a company that came
extraordinarily close to wiping them out within 10 years of
going public and that has already flirted with bankruptcy
twicebefore (see the Penn Central and Goldman Sachs
Trading Corporation fiascos).
To hammer this point home, I should point out that 10.2%
is not much above the historical average equity return in the
U.S. What is the risk of the value of the S&P 500 being
totally and permanently wiped out?
Where are the shareholders' yachts?
Goldman shareholders should require higher returns.
Apart from some "hiccups" along the way, the last 10 years
have been very favorable to the bank, which rode a roaring
growth cycle in an oligopoly industry that generates large
excess profits for its participants (unfortunately, even that
wasn't enough for bankers, who securitized every golden egg
the goose would lay, some of which turned out to be rotten
instead). However, investors don't appear to have shared in
the company's success to the degree that many other
companies' investors did.
During the prior ten years, Goldman beat out nearly
two-thirds of S&P 500 components in terms of revenue
growth. However, profit growth isn't anywhere near as
impressive -- with respect to net income, Goldman beat only
one in six companies (the figure for diluted earnings per
share before extraordinary items is similar). The trouble is
that Goldman has enormous variable costs; with employees
typically devouring upward of 40% of total revenues in
compensation before outside shareholders are even sat at the
table.
Looking forward
Will Goldman Sachs outperform the S&P 500 over the
next five- to 10-year period? I think the odds favor it, but
1) that's a relatively low hurdle, given the index's
current overvaluation, and 2) the range of possible
outcomes looks very wide, encompassing "utterly
disappointing" to "satisfactory."
Over the last decade, Goldman grew its book value per
share at rate of around 19% per year, well ahead of the rate
of share price appreciation. That type of growth is very
unlikely over the next decade, particularly since we can
expect higher capital requirements for institutions that are
"too big to fail" (Goldman is one), which would damp
profitability.
Don't look at the multiple for help
I don't foresee any help from the price-to-book
multiple, either. Sure, the multiple is lower than its
average value going back to July 1999 and quite a bit lower
than it was around the time of the IPO; however, as Goldman
reduces its leverage, its returns on equity must fall, which
will weigh the price-to-book value multiple. Continued... |